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Abstract
This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU
cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea
of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable.
It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core
stability.
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1 Introduction
In this section well-known results concerning core stability will be discussed
as well as an introduction to the question which forms the basis of the next
sections. Definitions which are given in the next sections will not be given
here. The reader is referred to either the original articles or the next sections
for any unfamiliar notation or concepts.
The core was one of the first solution concept to be introduced in the field
of transferrable utility n-person cooperative games. Since it’s conception the
core has been extensively study and characterised. It represents the set of
payoffs where no coalition of players receive less than what they can achieve
on their own. An open question relating to the core is the question, when
is the core stable? The idea of stability arises when the core coincides with
the von Neumman Morgernstern stable set. This means that every payoff
not within the core can be dominated by a payoff within the core. Such a
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solution concept is a very convincing one as there is always a "better" payoff
in the core than the payoffs outside the core (i.e. the payoff that dominates
the payoff outside the core). So the question, under what conditions (i.e.
what properties must the coalition function possess) is the core stable, is an
important question that deserves the attention of game theorists.
The question of core stability is almost as old as the field of Game Theory
itself. One of the earliest attempts to characterise when the core is stable
was provided by Gillies ([5]) in 1959. In this article Gillies introduced the
idea of majorization and proved that the core is stable if and only if any
imputation not belonging to the core is "majorizable". However this solution
only partially answered the question, as the conditions under which the core
is stable were not given via the coalition function. A second noteworthy
attempt was that of T.E. Kulakovskaja in 1971, ([9]). In this article the
author claims to have found necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed via
the coalition function, for core stability. Unfortunately this paper contains
an error which will be expounded now. For all the necessary notation not
given here the reader is referred to the article ([9]). However, some of the
notation required to state the "Theorem" will be provided here. First of all,
let I(v) be the set of imputations in 0− 1 normalized form and let
Uk({S1, . . . , Sk})
be the following set
{x ∈ I(v) |
∑
j∈Si
xj < v(Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
∑
j∈Ti
xj ≥ v(Ti), T 6= Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Secondly, the following definition will be necessary to state the "Theorem".
Definition 1.1. A coalition S such that the following inequalities,
y(T ) ≥ v(T )∀T such that T * S
y(S) ≤ v(S)
is solvable is said to be a strong coalition.
The following "Theorem" is stated in the paper ([9]).
Theorem 1.2. A game (N, v) has a stable core if and only if for any set
of coalitions {S1, . . . , Sk} with Uk({S1, . . . , Sk}) 6= ∅ the following conditions
are satisfied,
1) the set {S1, . . . , Sk} contains at least one strong coalition (without loss of
generality, let {S1, . . . , Sp} be the set of strong coalitions)
2) for any system of coverings {Ui,Λi}pi=1 associated respectively the strong
coalitions {S1, . . . , Sp} there exists a covering {U,Λ} generated by it such that
one of the following two relations hold
a) N\Si /∈ U, 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
(1.1)
m∑
i=1
αiv¯(Ti) +
p∑
i=1
ci[v(N)−
mi∑
j=1
β
(i)
j v
(i)(T
(i)
j )] > v(N)
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(1.2)
m∑
i=1
αiv¯(Ti) +
p∑
i=1
ci[v(N)−
mi∑
j=1
β
(i)
j v
(i)(T
(i)
j )] > v(N)
However when one considers the case p = 1, a plausible case for which ex-
amples can be easily found (eg. k = 1 in the above theorem such that
U1({S1}) 6= ∅ with S1 a strong coalition suffices. I give an example below for
this case.), then equation (1.1) reduces to the following
m∑
i=1
αiv¯(Ti) + v(I)−
m∑
i=1
αiv¯(Ti) > v(I)
which is equivalent to v(I) > v(I) which is absurd. Equation (1.2) then
also reduces to the statement that v(i) ≥ v(I) which is also absurd. So the
question concerning core stability was not solved by this article.
Example 1.3. An example will be given here showing the absurdity of
the previous theorem. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} that satisfies
v(N) = 2,
v(S) = 1 ∀ S ⊂ N with |S| = 2
and
v(i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N.
The core of this game is stable (see the comments below for symmetric
games). Note that U1({12}) 6= ∅, as for example
x = (0, 0.5, 1.5) ∈ U1({12}).
However {12} is a strong coalition, as the imputation x = (0.5, 0.5, 1) demon-
strates. Hence the core is stable, according to the previous "Theorem", if
and only if either 2 > 2 or 0 ≥ 2. Both these conditions are absurd hence the
core cannot be stable contradicting the fact that the core is stable, showing
that the theorem is false.
The main method of addressing the problem of core stability, which is utilised
by Game Theorists today, can be traced back to a paper by W. Sharkey in
1982 ([15]). In this paper he introduced the idea of a large core and proved
that if the core is large then it is stable. Following the ideas of this result, K.
Kikuta and L. Shapley ([8]) invented a new concept, that of extendability,
and showed that if a core is large then it is extendable and if the core is
extendable then it is stable. Researchers have also found examples of cores
which are extendable but not large, see J.R.G. van Gellekom et al. ([4]).
Since then, Game Theorists have continued working in this direction in an
attempt to generalise the results to find a ’largeness’ concept that is both
necessary and sufficient for core stability for all games in general.
That is not to say, however, that for specific classes of games core stability
has not already been characterised. In the article of A.K. Biswas et al. ([2])),
the authors provide necessary and sufficient conditions for core stability in
the case of symmetric games. For the definition of a symmetric game the
reader is referred to the aforementioned article. The theorem is as follows
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Theorem 1.4. For a symmetric game (N, v) the statements "(N, v) has a
large core", "(N, v) has a stable core" and "(N, v) is exact" are equivalent.
As well, in the case of Assignment games and totally balanced Min-colouring
games (see the corresponding sections for the relevant definitions) core sta-
bility has also been fully characterised. For the relevant theorems the reader
is referred to the section on Assignment games and Min-colouring games.
These results may be satisfactory for the special classes of games considered,
however one still would like necessary and sufficient conditions for core sta-
bility for all games in general. So game theorists are working parallel by
attempting to solve the problem for special classes of games and concomi-
tantly hoping that these solutions will provide insights into the general case.
In this thesis an attempt is made to contribute to this endeavour and the
methods employed are mainly based on the aforementioned results by K.
Kikuta and L. Shapley, namely extendability.
1.1 Cooperative Games
In this section the relevant ideas employed in this thesis and the develop-
ment and theory of these ideas that pertains to the following work will be
presented. The type of game analysed in this and the later sections is that of
a cooperative game in normalised form as introduced by von Neumann and
Morgernstern in "The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour", ([18]).
The cooperative game in normalised form is one of two of the major game
types introduced in their book, the second style of game falling under the
rubric of "non-cooperative". The major difference between a cooperative
game and a non-cooperative game was elucidated by John Harsanyi in his
paper "A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations", ([6]),
published in 1966. The basic idea was that a game is cooperative if one
is allowed to make agreements, promises and other such contracts between
players such that an ascendence between the participants of the game is en-
forceable. Non-cooperative games treat the situation where such enforceable
contracts are not available.
The games treated in this section will encompass games with a finite number
of players and transferrable utility (TU). In the setting of an n-person coop-
erative TU game one has pair, (N, v), where N represents the set of players
and is usually taken to be a finite subset of the natural numbers with num-
bers representing players (which is what will be adopted here), i.e. N $ N.
For the sake of simple notation it will be assumed that |N | = n. Finally v
is the coalition function, v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0, which describes
intuitively the worth of the coalition. A payoff to the players is generated
by a vector x, x ∈ Rn. To simplify the notation one often introduces the
following convention for a vector x ∈ Rn and a set S ⊆ N :
x(C) :=
∑
i∈C
xi,
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where each xi stands for 〈x, ei〉, (the brackets, 〈 , 〉, denote the scalar product)
and ei for the unit vector (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with the 1 in the ith position.
In addition, when comparing two vectors, x, y ∈ Rn,
x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn),
if the notation
x ≤ y
(or any other type of inequality for that matter, with the corresponding
changes in the preceding and following equations) for two vectors is used
then it means
xi ≤ yi ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
There are special classes of vectors in Rn for a given game (N, v) that will be
relevant for later on and one of these germane classes is known as the class
of imputations, denoted by I(v). In order to define the class of imputations
one needs two concepts, that of Pareto optimality and individual rationality.
The two definitions are as follows.
Definition 1.5. A payoff vector, x ∈ Rn, is said to be Pareto optimal if
x(N) = v(N).
The second definition of individual rationality is
Definition 1.6. A payoff vector, x ∈ Rn, is said to be individually rational
if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i = 1, . . . , |N |.
For a given game v, the class of imputations, I(v), are the set of all vectors
x ∈ Rn such that x is Pareto optimal and individually rational. That is,
I(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) ∀ i ∈ N}.
It is the relationship between imputations that defines the requisite solution
concepts investigated in this thesis and one particularly important relation-
ship between imputations is that of domination. This idea is encompassed
by the following definition.
Definition 1.7. Let (N,P, v) be an n-person cooperative game. An imputa-
tion η is said to dominate an imputation ζ via the coalition ∅ 6= D $ N if
the imputation η satisfies
η(D) ≤ v(D)
as well as
ηi > ζi ∀ i ∈ D.
In the case that η dominates ζ through the coalition D one writes
η domD ζ.
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The idea of domination is used to define two important solution concepts for
n-person cooperative games. One solution concept is that of the vNM stable
set. It was defined by von Neumann and Morgernstern in their book "The
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" using the ideas of internal and
external stability which are as follows.
Definition 1.8. A set of imputations V is internally stable if there does
not exist η and ζ ∈ V such that η dominates ζ.
Definition 1.9. A set of imputations V is externally stable if for all ζ ∈
I\V it follows that there exists a η ∈ V such that η dominates ζ.
Definition 1.10. Let (N, v) be an n-person cooperative game. A set of im-
putations in I, V, is said to be a vNM stable set if V is both internally and
externally stable.
The second solution concept introduced by D. B. Gillies in 1952 in Con-
tributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV, ([5]), utilising the idea of
domination is that of the core. The core is defined as the set of all undomi-
nated imputations that is,
Definition 1.11 (Core). Let (N, v) be an n-person cooperative game. The
core, C, is the set of all undominated imputations.
The core is a popular solution concept because of a property that it possesses
that the vNM stable sets tend not to possess, that is, a mathematical descrip-
tion of it for finite games is readily available. This description is provided
through the following Lemma
Lemma 1.12. Let (N, v) be an n-person cooperative game. The core of the
game v is the set of all imputations satisfying
x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀ ∅ 6= S ⊆ N.
The core is a solution concept that has been extensively investigated. One
of the main results concerning the core is a characterisation of when the core
is not empty. This characterisation was provided by Bondareva ([3]) in 1962
and independently by Shapley ([13]) in 1967. To be able to state the theorem
the idea of a balanced collection needs to be introduced. The definition here
follows that of eg. Peleg and Sudhölter ([10])
Definition 1.13. A collection of sets B ⊆ 2N , ∅ /∈ B, is called N-balanced
(or balanced over N) if there exists numbers δS > 0, S ∈ B such that∑
S∈B
δSχS = χN ,
where χT (i) = 1 for all i ∈ T and χT (i) = 0 for all i ∈ N\T . The collection
(δS)S∈B is called a system of balancing weights.
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In what follows, if there is no chance of confusion then the type of balanced-
ness in question (N-balanced, S-balanced, etc.) will just be referred to as
balanced in stead of N-balanced, etc. To present the Bondareva-Shapley
Theorem one requires the definition of a minimally balanced collection.
Definition 1.14. A balanced collection is minimally balanced if it has a
unique system of balancing weights.
Theorem 1.15. Let (N, v) be a game. Then C 6= ∅ if and only if
v(N) ≥
∑
S∈B
δSv(S) ∀ minimally balanced B with balancing (δS)S∈B
Hence a game with a nonempty core will be called balanced. The next
definition forms the basis of the first part of this investigation, that of the
stable core. The core is stable when the core coincides with the vNM stable
set.
Definition 1.16. The core is stable if for all imputations x ∈ I(v)\C there
exists an imputation y ∈ C and a set ∅ 6= S $ N such that y domS x.
It will also be necessary to consider subgames of the game (N, v). The game
(N, v) restricted to the player set S will be denoted by vS and the core of this
subgame will be denoted by CS = C(vS). vS is defined via vS(T ) = v(T ) for
all T ⊆ S. The following definition is also important for a number of results
later on.
Definition 1.17 (Extendability). Let (N, v) be a game. An imputation y ∈
CS, for ∅ 6= S $ N , is extendable if there is a core element x of C, such that
xi = yi for all i ∈ S. A coalition ∅ 6= S $ N is extendable if for every core
element y of the subgame (S, vS) there is a core element x of (N, v) such that
xi = yi for all i ∈ S. The game (N, v) is extendable if every core element of
every subgame can be extended to an element of the core of the game (N, v).
The idea of extendability can be viewed from a number of different per-
spectives. A definition equivalent to the previous definition of extendability
which reveals, more clearly, the role extendability plays for subsets of N is
the following. Such definitions are not new and can be found in articles such
as ([1]). Denote by CS(v) (note that CS := C(vS) and hence CS(v) :6= CS) the
projection of C to the subspace corresponding to the coalition S. That is
CS(v) := {x ∈ RS | there is y ∈ C such that yj = xj ∀ j ∈ S}.
Definition 1.18. A coalition S is extendable if C(vS) ⊆ CS(v). The game v
is extendable if C(vS) ⊆ CS(v) for all S ⊆ N .
As extendability plays a significant role in what is to come it would be useful if
one could find conditions under which a coalition is extendable. The following
result provides a sufficient condition for extendability.
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Proposition 1.19. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and S ⊆ N . Define the
following coalition function for all T $ N\S
w(T ) := max
R⊆S
{v(T ∪R)− v(R)} and w(N\S) = v(N)− v(S).
Then S is extendable if the core of the game (N\S,w) is nonempty.
Proof: If the core of the game (N\S,w) is nonempty then it follows that
there exists an y′ ∈ C(w) with y′(T ) ≥ w(T ) for all T ⊆ N\S. Then define
for y ∈ CS
ζ = (y, y′).
It will now be shown that ζ ∈ C. Note that
ζ(N) = y(N ∩ S) + y′(N ∩N\S) = v(S) + v(N)− v(S) = v(N).
As well for all T ⊆ N
ζ(T ) = y(T ∩S) + y′(T ∩N\S) ≥ v(T ∩S) +max
R⊆S
{v(T ∩N\S ∪R)− v(R)}.
Letting T ∩ S = Q it follows that
v(Q)+max
R⊆S
{v(T ∩N\S∪R)−v(R)} ≥ v(Q)+v(T ∩N\S∪Q)−v(Q) = v(T ).
Hence ζ ∈ C and all elements y ∈ CS are extendable. q.e.d.
Related to this definition is the following Theorem. The goal of this section
is to attempt to generalise this Theorem and explore the possibilities of pro-
viding necessary and sufficient conditions for core stability via the definition
of extendability.
Theorem 1.20 (Kikuta and Shapley (1986)([8])). Let (N, v) be balanced. If
(N, v) is extendable then the core of (N, v) is stable.
Now a question that has been posed is, is the extendability of the game (N, v)
a necessary condition for core stability? This question was answered by J.
R. G. van Gellekom et al. (1999) ([4]) with the following example.
Example 1.21. Let δ ∈ (0, 1], N = {1, . . . , 6} and v be given by the fol-
lowing: v(12) = v(13) = v(45) = v(46) = 1, v(N) = 4 − δ and v(S) = 0
otherwise. The coalition {1, 4} is not extendable, as v(14) = 0 as there does
not exist an element, z, of the core of (N, v) with z1 = z4 = 0. The core is
also stable (see article).
As this type of extendibility is not necessary one could also consider other
types of extendability such as the following.
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Definition 1.22 (i-Extendability). Let (N, v) be a game. An imputation
y ∈ CS, for ∅ 6= S $ N , is i-extendable if there is a core element x of CS∪i,
for some i ∈ N\S, such that xi = yi for all i ∈ S. A coalition ∅ 6= S $ N
is i-extendable if for every core element y of the subgame (S, vS) there is
a core element x of the subgame (S ∪ i, vS∪i), for some i ∈ N\S, such that
xi = yi for all i ∈ S. The game (N, v) is i-extendable if every core element
of every subgame (S, vS) can be extended to an element of the core of the
game (S ∪ i, vS∪i), for some i ∈ N\S and all S ⊆ N .
However this type of extendability also is not necessary because of the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 1.23. Let (N, v) be a game. If (N, v) is i-extendable then (N, v)
is extendable.
The proof of this result is left to the reader. Naturally one could also consider
S − extendability with appropriate modifications for sets T ⊆ N such that
N ⊆ T ∪ S however they also inevitably lead to a result like the previous
proposition.
To explore, more carefully, the exact meaning of this example the idea of
exactness needs to be introduced.
Definition 1.24 (Exact). A coalition, ∅ 6= S $ N , is exact if there exists
a y ∈ C with y(S) = v(S). A game is said to be exact if every coalition,
∅ 6= S $ N , is exact.
Note that proposition (1.19) can also be seen as a sufficient condition for
exactness of a coalition S. Using the definition of exactness it seems apparent
that to demand the extendability of every coalition would be unreasonable.
The reason for this is, if one considers the example of J. R. G. van Gellekom
et al. then one notices that the coalition {14} is not exact. So it would seem
absurd to require that the core of the subgame v{14} be extendable. However,
although the extendability of every coalition is not a necessary condition for
core stability, one has the following result.
Lemma 1.25. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let C be stable. Let S be a
coalition such that CS is not empty. If S satisfies
(1.3) v(S) + (|N\S| − 1)v(N) =
∑
i∈N\S
v(N\i)
then S is extendable.
Proof: For all y ∈ C the following statement is true for all i ∈ N ,
(1.4) yi ≤ v(N)− v(N\i).
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as y(N\i) ≥ v(N\i). Let S satisfy equation (1.3) and choose an element
y ∈ CS and let |N\S| = m. Then define
z := (v(N)− v(N\j1), . . . , v(N)− v(N\jm))
for all ji ∈ N\S as well as the following vector
y′ = (y, z).
Then y′ satisfies
y′(N) = y(S) + z(N\S) = v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S
(v(N)− v(N\i)) =
v(S) + (|N\S| − 1)v(N)−
∑
i∈N\S
v(N\i) + v(N) = v(N)
by equation (1.3). Were y′ not an element of the core then, because the core
is stable, there must exist an imputation x ∈ C that dominates y′. However
it is impossible to dominate y′ via a coalition T ⊆ S because
y′(T ) ≥ v(T ).
This then implies that the dominating coalition must contain i ∈ N\S. But
that is impossible because for all x ∈ C, x fulfills equation (1.4) for all i ∈ N .
Hence all elements y ∈ CS are extendable. q.e.d.
As a Corollary one has the following result.
Corollary 1.26. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let C be stable. Let
i ∈ N . If CN\{i} is nonempty then it is extendable.
This result is interesting because of the following result.
Proposition 1.27. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let for all i ∈ N ,
CN\{i} be stable and extendable. Then C is stable.
Proof: First of all let x be an imputation, /∈ C and let S ⊆ N such that
x(S) < v(S) and for all T $ S it follows that
x(T ) ≥ v(T ).
If S = N\i for i ∈ N then define
ε = v(N\i)− x(N\i).
Let |N\i| = n − 1. Now add to each element xi, for i ∈ N\i, the amount
ε
n−1 . That is define x
′ by
x′ = x+
ε
n− 1χN\i.
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Now x′ ∈ CN\i and the coalition N\i is extendable and hence x′ is extendable
to an element y ∈ C. This element y then satisfies
y domN\i x.
Hence the core C is stable. In the case that S 6= N\i then S $ N\i for some
i ∈ N . As CN\i is stable there exists an y ∈ CN\i and a coalition S $ N\i
such that
y domS x
and this y is extendable to an element of C. Hence the core C is stable.
q.e.d.
Both these results are interesting as they show that necessary and sufficient
conditions for core stability lie somewhere between the extendibility of all
N\i coalitions and the stability and extendibility of all N\i coalitions.
So as has been demonstrated the extendability of every coalition implies core
stability however the extendability of all N\i coalitions (when nonempty as
well as all coalitions satisfying equation (1.3)) is implied by core stability.
Based on these thoughts the next logical step seems to be
Conjecture 1.28. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If for all exact coalitions
∅ 6= S $ N , S is extendable then C is stable.
To simplify the language the extendability of all exact coalitions will be
referred to as exact extendability. The Conjecture will now be proven. To
prove the Conjecture however the following two Lemmata will be required. To
simplify the original method of proof presented by the author, two Lemmata
proposed by Peter Sudhölter are presented here. To see the original proof by
the author, the reader is referred to the Appendix.
Lemma 1.29. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and let x ∈ RN , x(N) =
v(N), x /∈ C. Then there exists an exact P $ N such that x(P ) < v(P )
Proof:
Let x1 /∈ C be as in the statement of the Lemma and let x0 ∈ C(N, v). Define
xλ := λx1 + (1− λ)x0
for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. As the core is convex and closed, there exists 0 < λˆ < 1 such
that
{xλ | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1} ∩ C(N, v) = {xλ | 0 ≤ λ ≤ λˆ}.
Set y = xλˆ. Then there exists P $ N such that y(P ) = v(P ) and x1(P ) <
v(P ), because x1 /∈ C. The coalition P has the desired properties. q.e.d.
A Corollary of this result which will be useful later on is the following. Let
(1.5) E(x) := {S | S is exact and x(S) < v(S)}.
Then it follows that
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Corollary 1.30. Let x ∈ RN , x(N) = v(N), x /∈ C. Then E(x) 6= ∅.
The following Lemma is the main tool used in the proof of the Conjecture.
However before the Lemma is presented the following notation is required.
Let x be an imputation and define
M(x) := {S |S $ N ;S exact with x(S) < v(S) and x(T ) ≥ v(T )∀T $ S}.
The set M(x), for a given imputation x, represents the exact coalitions S
such that there does not exist any exact subcoalition T with x(T ) < v(T ).
With this notation the following Lemma will be proven:
Lemma 1.31. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let every exact coalition in
C be extendable. If x /∈ C then M(x) 6= ∅.
Proof:
The Lemma will be proven via contradiction. So assume that there exists an
x /∈ C such that M(x) = ∅. That is, for all exact S $ N with x(S) < v(S)
there exist T $ S with x(T ) < v(T ) and T is not exact in C. Now choose
an exact S $ N such that there does not exist an exact R $ S with x(R) <
v(R). Then as before there exists a non-exact T with x(T ) < v(T ). Now
define the vector
y = x+
v(S)− x(S)
|S \ T | χS\T
(where χR is the indicator function on R ⊆ S). Then x ≤ y, y /∈ CS
and y(S) = v(S). Lemma (1.29) applied this to the imputation y with N in
Lemma (1.29) replaced by S implies that there exists a Q, Q $ S, exact in CS
such that y(Q) < v(Q) and hence x(Q) < v(Q). However as S is extendable,
by assumption, Q must be exact in C contradicting the assumption that there
did not exist an exact R $ S with x(R) < v(R). q.e.d.
With this Lemma the main result can now be proven.
Theorem 1.32. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If (N, v) is exact extendable
then C is stable.
Proof: By the previous Lemma it follows that for all imputations x /∈ C,
M(x) 6= ∅. So for a given x, choose S ∈M(x) and define
ε = v(S)− x(S).
Let s = |S|. Now add to each element xi, for i ∈ S, the amount εs . That is
define x′ by
x′ = x+
ε
s
χS.
Now x′ ∈ CS and the coalition S is exact and hence x′ is extendable to an
element y ∈ C. This element y then satisfies
y domS x.
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Hence the core C is stable. q.e.d.
Although exact extendability is sufficient for core stability it is not necessary.
An example, due to Peter Sudhölter, demonstrating this will be given in the
next subsection on Assignment games. However before this is done a class
of games will be presented here, for which exact extendability is a necessary
condition for core stability. The class of games are known as simple games.
Definition 1.33. A game (N, v) is a simple game if the coalition function v
only takes on the values 0 or 1.
Before the result can be stated for simple games the following definition is
needed.
Definition 1.34. A veto player is a player i ∈ N such that v(S− i) = 0, for
all coalitions ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . Let V = {i ∈ N | i is a veto player} be the set of
all veto players.
One also has the following well known result.
Lemma 1.35. Let (N, v) be a simple game. The core is non empty if and
only if V 6= ∅.
Using this result the following theorem can be proven.
Theorem 1.36. Let (N, v) be a simple game then the following are equiva-
lent,
1) the core is stable,
2) V 6= ∅ and
3) (N, v) is exact extendable.
Proof: The direction 1) ⇒ 2) follows directly from Lemma (1.35). The
direction 2)⇒ 3) can be proven as follows. Note that all imputations in the
core are of the form
(1.6)
∑
i∈V
xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ V and xi = 0 ∀ i /∈ V.
One notices that if V 6= ∅ the game (N, v) is exact. Hence it will be shown
how an arbitrary coalition S $ N can be extended. To do this a number of
cases will be considered. Firstly consider the case that S∩V 6= ∅ and V * S.
Then the only imputation in CS is the vector with zero in all the coordinates
i ∈ S. To extend this vector one defines yi = 0 for all i ∈ N\(V ∪ S) and
then simply divides 1 amongst the players V \S. By equation (1.6) it follows
that this new vector y is an element of the core. If S ∩ V 6= ∅ and V ⊆ S
then one extends an element of CS by giving all i ∈ N\S the value 0. Finally
if S ∩ V = ∅ then it is obvious how to extend the vector. Finally 3) ⇒ 1) is
implied by Theorem (1.32). q.e.d.
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As was stated earlier, in general, exact extendability is not necessary for core
stability. This requires one to look for new ideas relating to extendability
that might prove to be necessary for core stability. The following is such.
Definition 1.37 (Full Coalition). Let (N, v) be a game and S be a coalition.
Call ∅ 6= S $ N a full coalition if there exists a core element, x, of the
subgame (S, vS) such that x(T ) > v(T ) for all proper subcoalitions T of S;
that is, S is a full coalition if the dimension of CS is full, i.e. (|S| − 1).
Full coalitions are very interesting coalitions and play an important role in
the stability of the core as the following Lemma and subsequent Corollary
(1.41) demonstrate.
Lemma 1.38. Let (N, v) be a game and an imputation x /∈ C such that there
exists an imputation y and a coalition S such that
y domS x.
Then there exists a full coalition T ⊆ S such that
y domT x.
Proof: Were S and all subcoalitions of S such that none of them were full
then it follows that there exists T1 $ S such that y(T1) = v(T1) however
yi > xi for all i ∈ T1. However T1 is also not full hence there exists T2 $ T1
such that y(T2) = v(T2) with yi > xi for all i ∈ T2. This argument can be
continued to the point where one is only left with singleton subsets of the
original set Tn. However this set Tn is also not full hence there exists a i ∈ Tn
such that yi = v(i) and hence y cannot dominate x. q.e.d.
The goal is now to restrict the extendability of coalitions not only to exact
coalitions but to exact coalitions which are also full. However there are two
possible ways to do this. They are both defined here and called strong and
weak fully exactness.
Definition 1.39 (Weak Fully Exact). Let (N, v) be a game. A coalition S is
called weak fully exact, if S is both a full coalition and there exists a y ∈ C
such that y(S) = v(S).
Weak fully exactness is due to Peter Sudhölter.
Definition 1.40 (Strong Fully Exact). Let (N, v) be a game. A coalition S
is called strong fully exact, if S is both a full coalition and there exists a
y ∈ C such that y(S) = v(S) and y(T ) > v(T ) for all T $ S.
Obviously strong fully exactness implies weak fully exactness.
Again if all weak/strong fully exact coalitions are extendable then the game
will be referred to as weak/strong fully exact extendable.
As a corollary of Lemma (1.38) one has the following result.
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Corollary 1.41. Let (N, v) be a balanced game.
Let Φ = {S ⊆ N |S is strong fully exact}. If the core is stable then Φ 6= ∅ or
C = I(v).
Proof: If Φ = ∅ and C 6= I(v) then it follows be the previous lemma that
there exists an imputation x /∈ C such that x cannot be dominated. Hence if
Φ = ∅ the only possibility is that C = I(v). q.e.d.
Before discussing weak/strong fully exact coalitions and results related to
them, a few observations regarding the earlier set M(x) are appropriate.
First of all one notices that for all S ∈ M(x), S is weak fully exact. This
observation will be interesting when the set FEW (x) is introduced later on.
To state the next result the following idea of a minimal set is requisite.
Definition 1.42. A coalition S is minimal in a collection of sets C, if there
does not exist T $ S with T ∈ C.
One now notices the following result regarding the elements of E(x) and the
elements of M(x).
Lemma 1.43. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and let x be an imputation
and x /∈ C. Then all minimal S ∈ E(x) satisfy S ∈M(x).
Proof: So choose minimal S ∈ E(x) and assume that S /∈ M(x). This
implies that there exists a coalition T $ S such that x(T ) < v(T ). A simple
application of Lemma (1.29), exactly as was done in Lemma (1.31), shows
now that there exists a R $ S such that R is exact and x(R) < v(R). A
contradiction. q.e.d.
This Lemma also provides an indirect proof of the coming Lemma (1.44).
So as one can see the sets that play an important and interesting role are
those S that are minimal in E(x). By examining these minimal sets in E(x),
i.e. the sets in M(x), this leads one to the definition of weak/strong fully
exactness. This line of thought will again be taken up after Theorem (1.46)
when the corresponding sets for weak/strong fully exactness are examined.
Weak and strong fully exact coalitions are a rather auspicious concept when
it comes to proving results relating to full exact coalitions. This is due to the
fact that fully exact coalitions are a rare species of coalitions. In a specific
type of game either only a small number of coalitions turn out to be fully
exact or fully exact coalitions do not exist at all. This can be seen as an
advantage. For the classes of games, for which fully exact coalitions do exist,
this makes proving that fully exact extendability is a necessary condition for
core stability a lot easier because one doesn’t have to consider all coalitions.
In order to prove that weak fully exact extendability is sufficient for core
stability two Lemmata need to be proven. In the following Lemma let the
set E(x) be that defined by equation (1.5). The proof given here is due to
Peter Sudhölter. To see a proof by the author the reader is referred to the
appendix.
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Lemma 1.44. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and let x be an imputation
and x /∈ C. Then for all minimal S ∈ E(x) it follows that S is weak fully
exact.
Proof: By Corollary (1.30), E(x) 6= ∅. Let S ∈ E(x) be minimal. It
will now be shown that S is weak fully exact. Indeed, let β ∈ C such that
β(S) = v(S). By the minimality of S, β(T ) > v(T ) for all T $ S with
x(T ) < v(T ). Hence, there exists ε > 0 such that y(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T $ S,
where y = (1 − ε)β + εx. As ε > 0, d = v(S) − y(S) > 0. Hence it can be
concluded that
z = y +
d
|S|χS ∈ CS
and z(T ) > v(T ) for all ∅ 6= T $ S. q.e.d.
With this result a Lemma similar to Lemma (1.31) can be proven, which
will then be applied in a similar fashion to prove the main result relating
weak fully exact extendability and core stability. So as before, let x be an
imputation and define
FEW (x) := {S |S $ N ;S is weak fully exact with x(S) < v(S)
and x(T ) ≥ v(T ) ∀ T $ S}.
Lemma 1.45. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let every weak fully exact
coalition in C be extendable. If x /∈ C then FEW (x) 6= ∅.
Proof:
The Lemma will be proven via contradiction. So assume that there exists
a x /∈ C such that FEW (x) = ∅. That is, for all weak fully exact S $ N
with x(S) < v(S) there exist T $ S with x(T ) < v(T ) and T is not weak
fully exact in C. Now choose a weak fully exact S $ N such that there does
not exist a weak fully exact R $ S with x(R) < v(R). Then as before there
exists a non-weak fully exact T with x(T ) < v(T ). Define the vector
y = x+
v(S)− x(S)
|S \ T | χS\T .
Then x ≤ y and y(S) = v(S). As y /∈ CS it follows, from Lemma (1.44), that
there exists a Q, Q $ S, weak fully exact in CS such that y(Q) < v(Q) and
hence x(Q) < v(Q). However as S is extendable, by assumption, Q must be
weak fully exact in C contradicting the assumption that there did not exist
a weak fully exact R $ S with x(R) < v(R). q.e.d.
With this result the main Theorem relating weak fully exact extendability
and core stability can be proven.
Theorem 1.46. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If (N, v) is weak fully exact
extendable then C is stable.
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Proof: By the previous Lemma it follows that for all imputations x /∈ C,
FEW (x) 6= ∅. So for a given x, choose S ∈ FEW (x) and define
ε = v(S)− x(S).
Let s = |S|. Now add to each element xi, for i ∈ S, the amount εs , that is
define x′ by
x′ = x+
ε
s
χS
Now x′ ∈ CS and the coalition S is exact and hence x′ is extendable to an
element y ∈ C. This element y then satisfies
y domS x.
Hence the core, C, is stable. q.e.d.
In addition one can replace 3) in Theorem (1.36) with (N,v) is weak fully
exact extendable and the result remains valid. The proof of this claim is left
to the reader.
However like exact extendability, weak fully exact extendability is not a nec-
essary condition for core stability. The truth of this statement is demon-
strated in the section on Orthogonal games.
A short analysis of the set FEW (x), M(x), inter alia will be provided here,
similar to that given after the definition of fully exactness. First of all if one
examines the definition of FEW (x) one notices that in reality
FEW (x) = M(x).
This claim follows directly from the definitions. In addition, by defining the
following set
(1.7) FW (x) := {S | S is weak fully exact and x(S) < v(S)},
one can show the following result, analogous to Lemma (1.43).
Lemma 1.47. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and let x ∈ RN , x(N) =
v(N), x /∈ C. Then all minimal S ∈ FW (x) are such that S ∈ FEW (x) and
hence S ∈M(x).
The reader may then ask him or herself, is it then true that the minimal
coalitions in E(x) and FW (x) are the same? If so, then the reader will have
inferred correctly. This follows directly from Lemma (1.43). These consider-
ations lead to the result that an analogous Lemma, like Lemma (1.44), would
not be correct for strong fully exactness. That is, for x /∈ C there does not
necessarily exist a strong fully exact coalition S so that x(S) < v(S). The
following example demonstrates this observation.
Example 1.48. Define (N, v) as follows.
v(N) = 2, v(12) = 2, v(23) = 1, v(13) = 1 and v(i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N
Then C = (1, 1, 0) and for the point x = (0.8, 1.2, 0) /∈ C there does not exist
a strong fully exact S so that x(S) < v(S) as only x(13) < v(13) and the
coalition S = {1, 3} is not strong fully exact.
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Although strong fully exact extendability is, in general, not sufficient for core
stability. It is sufficient for certain classes of games as the following results
demonstrate.
Proposition 1.49. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and and let the coali-
tion N be full. Let x be an imputation and x /∈ C. Then there exists S ∈ E(x)
such that S is strong fully exact.
Proof: Consider x /∈ C and choose y ∈ C such that y(N) = v(N) and
y(S) > v(S) for all S $ N . Let 1 ≥ ε > 0 and consider the following vector
β = (1− ε)y + εx.
Then choose ε so that β(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T ⊆ N and that equality holds
for at least one coalition S $ N . Then take the smallest R $ N such that
β(R) = v(R) and there does not exist Q $ R with β(Q) = v(Q) (this is
possible as x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N and y(i) > v(i) for all i ∈ N). Then the
coalition R is strong fully exact and x(R) < v(R). q.e.d.
Now one can define a set analogous FEW as follows
FES(x) := {S |S $ N ;S is strong fully exact with x(S) < v(S)
and x(T ) ≥ v(T ) ∀ T $ S}.
and prove an analogous result to Lemma (1.45), that is,
Lemma 1.50. Let (N, v) be a balanced game with the coalition N full and let
every strong fully exact coalition in C be extendable. If x /∈ C then FES(x) 6=
∅.
Subsequently the following theorem follows from Lemma (1.50).
Theorem 1.51. Let (N, v) be a balanced game such that the coalition N is
full. If (N, v) is strong fully exact extendable then C is stable.
The drawback of this result is that numerous TU cooperative games do not
satisfy the condition that N is full, for example Assignment games and Or-
thogonal games.
Other ways of extending the idea of extendability have also been examined
by numerous researches in order to try and find a type of extendability that
is both sufficient and necessary for core stability. One such idea that extends
the idea of extendability is the following given in ([17]) and uses the idea of
an essential coalition.
Definition 1.52. A coalition S ⊆ N is essential if for all partitions P of S
it follows that ∑
T∈P
v(T ) < v(S)
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Definition 1.53. A game (N, v) is called essential extendable if all essential
coalitions are extendable.
In ([17]) they prove the following result
Lemma 1.54. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If (N, v) is essential extendable
then the core is stable.
A natural extension of this result would be to not just consider partitions
but also balanced collections.
Definition 1.55. A coalition S ⊆ N is minimally balanced essential if for
all minimally balanced collections B of S with balancing coefficients (δT )T∈B
it follows that ∑
T∈B
δTv(T ) < v(S)
Definition 1.56. A game (N, v) is called min balanced essential extendable
if all minimally balanced essential coalitions are extendable.
Lemma 1.57. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If (N, v) is min balanced
essential extendable then the core is stable.
Proof: Let x /∈ C be an imputation. Choose S $ N such that x(S) < v(S)
however for all T $ S, x(T ) ≥ v(T ). It then follows that the coalition S
is minimally balanced essential. If S were not min balanced essential then
there would exist a minimally balanced coalition B such that
v(S) ≤
∑
T∈B
δTv(T ) ≤
∑
T∈B
δTx(T ) = x(S) < v(S)
a contradiction. So let
ε = v(S)− x(S)
Let s = |S|. Now add to each element xi, for i ∈ S, the amount εs , that is
define x′ by
x′ = x+
ε
s
χS
Now x′ ∈ CS and the coalition S is min balanced essential and hence x′ is
extendable to an element y ∈ C. This element y then satisfies
y domS x.
Hence the core, C, is stable. q.e.d.
The idea of a minimal balanced essential coalition is not only interesting
because of the previous result but also because of the following.
Lemma 1.58. A coalition is full if and only if it is minimally balanced es-
sential.
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Proof: To prove the if direction assume that the coalition S is not minimally
balanced essential, that is there exists a minimally balanced collection B with
balancing coefficients (δT )T∈B such that
v(S) ≤
∑
T∈B
δTv(T ).
As S is full there exists an imputation x ∈ CS such that x(T ) > v(T ) for all
T $ S. This then implies that
v(S) ≤
∑
T∈B
δTv(T ) <
∑
T∈B
δTx(T ) = x(S) = v(S)
which is a contradiction. To prove the other direction assume that S is
minimally balanced essential. Then define
d = max
∑
T∈B
δTv(T )
for all minimally balanced coalitions B. By Theorem (1.15) it follows that
the following game defined by w has a nonempty core.
w(T ) = v(T ) ∀ T $ S and w(S) = d
Choose x ∈ CS for the game w and define
δ = v(S)− d > 0
Let s = |S|. Now add to each element xi, for i ∈ S, the amount δs , that is
define x′ by
x′ = x+
δ
s
χS
Now x′ ∈ CS for the game v and satisfies x′(T ) > v(T ) for all T $ S and
x′(S) = v(S) hence S is a full coalition. q.e.d.
As a corollary one has that
Corollary 1.59. Let (N, v) be a balanced game. If every exact coalition S
satisfying
v(S) >
∑
T∈B
δTv(T ) ∀ minimally balanced B ⊆ 2S with balancing (δT )T∈B
is extendable then the core is stable.
Finally another question that one may ask is whether weak/strong fully
exactness is a necessary or sufficient condition for core stability. As the
following two examples demonstrate the condition is neither necessary nor
sufficient. The first example demonstrates that it is not necessary.
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Example 1.60. Let N = {1, . . . , 6} and v be given by the following: v(14) =
0.5, v(12) = v(13) = v(45) = v(46) = 1, v(N) = 3.5 and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
The core is stable however the coalition {14} is neither weak nor strong fully
exact. Take x /∈ C, an imputation, and without loss of generality (see Lemma
(1.29)) assume that x(12) < v(12). Let
ε = v(12)− x(12) > 0.
Then define the following vector
y := (x1 +
ε
2
, x2 +
ε
2
, 1− x1 − ε
2
, 0.5− x1 − ε
2
, 0.5 + x1 +
ε
2
, 1.5− x2 − ε
2
).
Then y ∈ C and
y dom12 x.
The second example demonstrates that weak/strong fully exactness is not
sufficient for core stability.
Example 1.61. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define v as follows. v(S) = 0.6 for all
S $ N with |S| = 2 and v(N) = 1 and v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then C is
not stable (eg. x = (0.5, 0.5, 0)) however (0.3, 0.3) ∈ CS for all S $ N with
|S| = 2.
The goal of the following subsections is to investigate classes of games on
which the idea of weak fully exact extendability could be shown to be a
necessary condition as well as presenting an example, which shows that weak
fully exact extendability is not necessary for core stability. In each subsection
a class of games will be introduced and then, on this class of games, results
relating to core stability and weak fully exact extendability will be presented.
The subsections are as follows, Assignment games, Min-colouring games and
finally Orthogonal games.
1.2 Assignment Games
In this subsection the concept of an Assignment game will be introduced and
core stability in relation to fully exact extendability will be explored.
The concept of an Assignment game was introduced by Shapley and Shubik
in ([14]) in 1972. The idea is that there exists a market for goods with
buyers and sellers willing to trade a certain good. Each buyer has a value for
each sellers good and the buyers and sellers want to know how to distribute
the common gains when they all cooperate together and maximise the total
amount that exchanges hands during the buying and selling process. In
mathematical terms an Assignment game can be defined as follows. The
notation here follows that of, eg. Raghavan and Sudhölter ([11]). For finite
sets S and T , both subsets of N , an assignment is a bijection b : S ′ → T ′
such that S ′ ⊂ S and T ′ ⊂ T and |S ′| = |T ′| = min{|S|, |T |}. To simplify
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summations later on, b will be identified with {(i, b(i)) | i ∈ S ′}. Let B(S, T )
denote the set of all assignments. A game (N, v) is an assignment game if
there exists a partition {P, P ′} of N and a non-negative real valued matrix
A = (aii′)i∈P,i′∈P ′ such that
v(S) = max
b∈B(S∩P,S∩P ′)
∑
(i,i′)∈b
aii′ .
In order to characterise when the core is stable the following concept of a
dominant diagonal is needed.
Definition 1.62. The matrix A is said to have a dominant diagonal if
aii′ = max
j′∈P ′
aij′ = max
j∈P
aji′ ∀ i ∈ P
In Solymosi and Raghavan, ([16]), they show that for assignment games
characterized by such matrices, this condition of a "dominant diagonal" is
necessary and sufficient for core stability. That is
Theorem 1.63. Let (N, v) be an assignment game. Then A has a dominant
diagonal if and only if the core is stable.
As was mentioned in the previous section exact extendability is not neces-
sary for core stability. The example that verifies this claim, due to Peter
Sudhölter, is as follows.
Example 1.64. Let (N, v) be an assignment game associated to the following
square matrix, A =
 6 4 00 6 0
4 0 6
 . Let 1, 2 and 3 be the row players and
4, 5 and 6 be the column players. Note that, e.g., with S = {1, 3, 4, 5},
v(S) = max{6 + 0, 4 + 4} = 8. Hence, xS = (4, 0, 4, 0) ∈ C(S, vS). Let
y = (3, 5, 1, 3, 1, 5). Then y ∈ C(N, v) and yS ∈ C(S, vS) and, hence, S
is exact. Clearly, xS cannot be extended (because any core element must
assign 6 to all pairs of optimally matched players, e.g., to the pair {1, 4}).
Note that the diagonal entries of the matrix A are the maximal entries for
their respective row and coloumn (A has a "dominant diagonal"). Hence by
Theorem (1.63) the core of this example is stable however the exact coalition
S = {1, 3, 4, 5} is not extendable.
Although exact extendability is not necessary for core stability, weak fully
exact extendability is. To prove this, a fact concerning the nature of elements
in the core in Assignment games are needed. In ([14]), apart from introducing
the idea of an assignment game, the authors show, inter alia, that assignment
games are totally balanced and that elements of the core are characterised
as follows. An element x ∈ I(v) is an element of the core if it satisfies the
following three conditions.
x(N) = v(N)
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xi ≥ 0∀ i ∈ N
x(ij′) ≥ aij′ ∀ i ∈ P and j′ ∈ P ′.
This characterisation will now be used to prove the following result. The
following result was conjectured by Peter Sudhölter.
Theorem 1.65. Let (N, v) be an assignment game. The following two con-
ditions are equivalent:
1) All weak fully exact coalitions S ⊆ N are extendable,
2) The core C is stable.
Proof: Note that the direction 1) ⇒ 2) is implied by Theorem (1.46). The
direction 2)⇒ 1) is proven as follows. Let (N, v) be an assignment game and
let S be an exact subset of N such that |S| > 2. Let b ∈ B(S ∩ P, S ∩ P ′)
such that
v(S) =
∑
(i,j′)∈b
aij′ .
Firstly notice that for all x ∈ CS, x satisfies x(i, b(i)) ≥ v(i, b(i)). However
as x(S) = v(S) it follows from
x(S) =
∑
(i,i′)∈b
xij
that x(i, b(i)) = v(i, b(i)) and hence there do not exist fully exact coalitions S
for all |S| > 2. So it just needs to be shown that for all fully exact coalitions
S with |S| = 2 that S is extendable. To this end, let k, l be elements of P . It
suffices to show the following: If x in C such that xk + xl′ = akl′ , then there
exists y in C such that
(1.8) yk = 0
and
(1.9) yl′ = akl′ .
Define yi = max(0, xi − xk), yi′ = min(xi′ + xk, aii′) for all i in P . It is clear
that y satisfies (1.8) and (1.9). From the definition of y it follows that yi ≥ 0.
It will now be shown that for this y, y(N) = v(N). Now
(1.10) y(N) =
∑
i∈P
max(0, xi − xk) + min(xi′ + xk, aii′)
where i′ = b(i) for the b which defines v(N). Now v(N) =
∑
i∈P aii′ so it
just needs to be shown that yi + yi′ = aii′ . So consider the case that xi ≥ xk
then xk + xi′ ≤ aii′ which implies that the first summand in equation (1.10)
is 0 and the second summand is aii′ , hence yi + yi′ = aii′ . Now for the case
that xi < xk then it follows that xk + xi′ > aii′ and hence for this i the sum
yi + yi′ becomes
xi − xk + xi′ + xk = aii′ .
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Hence one has that y(N) = v(N). The final step in showing that y is an
element of the core is to show that
y(ij′) ≥ aij′ ∀ i, j ∈ N.
To this end consider the case that xi ≥ xk then
y(ij′) = xi − xk +min(xj′ + xk, aij′) ≥ a(ij′).
In the second case that xi < xk then yi = 0 and it follows that
y(j′) ≥ xj′ + xk > xi + xj′ ≥ v(ij′).
Hence all two player coalitions are extendable. q.e.d.
So on the class of Assignment games one finds that weak fully exact extend-
ability is both necessary and sufficient for core stability.
1.3 Orthogonal Games
In this section the relationship between Orthogonal games and fully exact ex-
tendability will be investigated. Orthogonal games are games that represent
a subset of the games defined by the minimum of a finite number of additive
measures. A major step in the studying the class of games defined by the
minimum of a finite number of additive measures was taken by Kalai and
Zemel in 1982 in ([7]). In this article they showed that a game (N, v) is totally
balanced if and only if it is the minimum of finitely many additive measures.
The subclass of these games, Orthogonal games, are such that the coalition
function can be represented as the minimum of finitely many additive mea-
sures, whereby each of the measures has no player (the coordinates defining
the values) in common with another measure that has a positive measure.
This class of games has quite a long history within the field of Game theory
and comes in a number of guises. Orthogonal games such as Glove market
games have been well studied and have led to multifarious variations on this
theme.
It is Orthogonal games that will be studied in this section and the main
result presented here is that fully exact extendability is not necessary for
core stability.
The mathematical definition of an Orthogonal game will now be given and
the notation follows that of, eg. Raghavan and Sudhölter ([11]). Firstly a
game (N, v) is the minimum of finitely many additive measures if v can be
written as follows. Let λρ be such that λρ ∈ RN+ for all ρ ∈ {1, . . . , r},
v(S) = min
ρ=1,...,r
λρ(S) ∀S ⊆ N.
A totally balanced game (N, v) is said to orthogonal if the carriers of the
finite measures λρ, {ρ = 1, . . . , r}, are mutually disjoint. This assumption
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allows one to present a more informative notation for orthogonal games.
For each ρ ∈ {1, . . . , r} it follows that there exists a Nρ ⊆ N such that
{i ∈ Nρ |λρi > 0} ⊆ N and the resulting {Nρ | ρ = 1, . . . , r} is a partition of
N . One then normally writes λ =
∑r
ρ=1 λ
ρ and with this notation one has
λρi = λi for i ∈ Nρ and λρj = 0 for j ∈ N\Nρ. So for orthogonal games one
can write the coalition function as follows
v(S) = min
ρ=1,...,r
λ(S ∩Nρ)
for all S ⊆ N . The pair ({Nρ | ρ = 1, . . . , r}, λ) is called a representation
of (N, v). One should note that the representation of an orthogonal game
is practically unique. Hence the measure λ defining the game is uniquely
determined. Provided that the game is not such that v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N
then the partition {Nρ | ρ = 1, . . . , r} is uniquely determined up to dummy
players.
To present a result concerning stable cores for Orthogonal games the following
two Lemmata will be needed. The proofs of the following results can be found
in ([11]).
Lemma 1.66. An Orthogonal game (N, v) is exact if and only if λ(Nρ) =
v(N) for every ρ = 1, . . . , r.
Lemma 1.67. If an Orthogonal game has a stable core then it is exact.
Within the class of Orthogonal games certain sets play a special role in
determining the structure of the core. One such collection of sets is that of
the diagonal sets, D, defined as follows.
D := {S ⊆ N |λ(S ∩Nρ) = λ(S ∩Nσ) ∀ ρ, σ ∈ {ρ = 1, . . . , r}}
The significance of these sets evinces when one considers the core. The
diagonal sets can be used to define conditions under which the core takes a
special form. Before the results can be stated, however, some notation needs
to be introduced. This notation follows that of, eg. Rosenmüller ([12]). First
of all, define
Ac = {λρ ∈ RN+ | λρ(N) = c}.
That is, Ac is the set of all additive measures with a constant total mea-
sure equal to c. Then in order to introduce the definition of a weakly non
degenerate system of measures, the following two sets need to be defined.
L := {x ∈ RN | ∃ c ∈ Rr,
r∑
i=1
ci = 1, x =
r∑
i=1
ciλ
i}
and
X := {x ∈ RN |x(S) = v(S), (S ∈ D)}.
Note that, for Orthogonal games, it is always the case that L ⊆ X. With
these two sets the following definition of weakly non degenerate with respect
to a set of measures λ1, . . . , λr ∈ Ac can be introduced.
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Definition 1.68. A set of measures λ1, . . . , λr ∈ Ac is said to be weakly
non degenerate (weakly n.d.) if L = X.
In ([12]) additional conditions are provided which are equivalent to the state-
ment given here. The importance of a weakly n.d. set of measures is embod-
ied in the following theorem proven in ([12]).
Theorem 1.69. Let λ1, . . . , λr ∈ Ac be orthogonal and weakly n.d. Then
λ1, . . . , λr are all the extreme points of the core.
As a result of this Theorem and Lemma (1.66) and (1.67), one has the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 1.70. Let (N, v) be a weakly n.d., Orthogonal game (represented
by ({Nρ | ρ = 1, . . . , r}, λ)) and let the core C be stable.
Then C = convH{λ1, . . . , λr}, where convH means ’the convex hull of ’.
However it is not this result that is quintessential here. The most important
result in this section is the demonstration that weak fully exact extendability
is not necessary for core stability. To expound this result some notation must
be introduced. The notation introduced just modifies the way the games are
written and make explicit certain ’types’ that define the measures λρ. As well,
for the example it will only be required that ρ ∈ {1, 2}, that is there are two
orthogonal measures, λ1 and λ2 defining v. It will also only be required that
each measure is positive in a finite number of coordinates and hence there
are a fixed set of values that the measures take, say g1α, α ∈ {1, . . . , n} := G1,
for λ1 and similarly g2α, α ∈ {1, . . . ,m} := G2, for λ2. One can then write,
for a given measure λρ,
(1.11) λρ(S) = |Kρ1 ∩ S|gρ1 + |Kρ2 ∩ S|gρ2 + . . .+ |Kρk ∩ S|gρk
(k = n for ρ = 1 and k = m when ρ = 2) where Kρi represent the coordinates
(entries in λρ) with the value gρi and satisfy
n⋃
i=1
Kρi = N
ρ and
⋂
i,j∈Gρ
Kρi = ∅ for ρ = {1, 2}.
By restricting n = 2 and defining,
(1.12) Mρ := max(gρ2 − 1) + gρ2 min(|Kρ2 |,
g3−ρ
d
− 1),
where d := g.c.d.(gρ1 , g
ρ
2), one has the following result for the case where
gρ1 = 1 for ρ ∈ {1, 2},
Lemma 1.71. For ρ = {1, 2}, let λρ be given by (1.11) and Mρ by (1.12).
Whenever |Kρ1 | ≥Mρ, ρ = {1, 2}, holds true, then the core is stable.
The reader is referred to Rosenmüller ([12]) for a proof. This Lemma and
Theorem (1.69) will now be used to show that weak fully exact extendability
is not necessary for core stability.
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Example 1.72. Let λ = (2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1) and let N1 = {1, 2, 3} and N2 =
{4, 5, 6}, that is
v(S) = λ1(S ∩N) + λ2(S ∩N),
with λ1 = (2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) and λ2 = (0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1). Note that M1 = M2 = 1
and |K11 | = |K21 | = 2, so that this game satisfies the conditions of Lemma
(1.71) and hence has a stable core. It will now be shown that the game is
weakly n.d. In order to do this it will be shown that X ⊆ L. So first of all
D = {{1, 5, 6}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 5}, {3, 6},
{1, 2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 6}, {2, 3, 5, 6}}.
By applying the equalities x(S) = v(S) for S ∈ D it follows that for all x ∈ X
x1 = 2x2 = 2x3 and x4 = 2x5 = 2x6 and x(N) = 4.
(For the first equality above, one subtracts from x({1, 5, 6}), x({2, 5}) and
x({2, 6}) and one has that x1 = 2x2. Similar computations yield the other
equalities.) Hence all points x ∈ X are of the form
x = α(2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) + (1− α)(0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1)
for α ∈ [0, 1]. This then implies that x ∈ L hence X ⊆ L and the game
is weakly non degenerate. This implies that C = convH{λ1, λ2}. However
if one considers the subgame on the player set S = {1, 5, 6} one sees that
the core of this subgame is fully exact (e.g. (1, 0.5, 0.5) ∈ CS) however this
subcore is not extendable (e.g. the point (0.5, 1, 0.5) ∈ CS is not extendable as
C = convH{λ1, λ2}). This demonstrates that weak fully exact extendability
is not a necessary condition for core stability.
1.4 Appendix
In this section the author’s original method for proving Theorem (1.32) as
well as a second proof of Lemma (1.29), given by Peter Sudhölter, are pro-
vided. The author would like to thank Professor J. Rosenumüller for his
helpful suggestions and comments in improving the perspicuousness of the
first Lemma’s proof.
Lemma 1.73. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let T $ N be non exact in
C. Let x ∈ RN with x(N) < v(N) and x(T ) ≤ v(T ). Then there exists an
exact P ⊆ N with
x(P ) < v(P )
Proof:
1stSTEP :
First of all the following claim will be proven. Let T be non exact and let
y ∈ RN satisfy
(1.13) y(N) = v(N), y(T ) ≤ v(T )
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hence y /∈ C. Then there exists an exact S ∈ 2N such that
(1.14) y(S) < v(S).
To see this, assume ’per absurdum’ that
(1.15) y(S) ≥ v(S), ∀ S ∈ 2N , S exact.
holds true. As v is balanced one can choose β ∈ C and define
zλ := λy + (1− λ)β, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Let
λ∗ := max{λ | zλ ∈ C} < 1.
Then z∗ := zλ∗ ∈ C and there exists M∗ ∈ 2N with
(1.16) z∗(M∗) = v(M∗)
(1.17) zλ
∗+ε < v(M∗), ε > 0
Now, (1.16) implies that M∗ is exact (as z∗ ∈ C). Hence
y(M∗) ≥ v(M∗)
by (1.15) and β(M∗) ≥ v(M∗) as β ∈ C, which contradicts (1.17), hence
(1.14) is true.
2ndSTEP :
To prove the Lemma, consider now x ∈ RN such that x(N) < v(N) and
x(T ) ≤ v(T ). Define
δ := v(N)− x(N)
and
ε := v(T )− x(T ).
The proof will now be divided up into a number of cases.
Case 1 Assume that δ > ε
Let |T | := t < n. In this case define a new vector x′ by adding
δ
t
to each xi for i ∈ T , that is
x′i = xi +
δ
t
∀ i ∈ T
and
x′i = xi ∀ i ∈ N\T.
One then has that
x′(N) = v(N) and x′(T ) < v(T )
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and hence, from the first step, there exists an exact coalition P such that
x′(P ) < v(P ).
As x ≤ x′ it follows that
x(P ) < v(P ).
Case 2 Assume that δ < ε
Let |T | := t < n. In this case define a new vector x′ by adding
ε
t
to each xi for i ∈ T , that is
x′i = xi +
ε
t
∀ i ∈ T
and
x′i = xi ∀ i ∈ N\T.
One then has that
x′(N) < v(N) and x′(T ) = v(T )
Choose j ∈ N\T and define
σ := v(N)− x′(N)
and define a new vector xˆ by adding σ to x′j so that
xˆj = xj + σ
and
xˆi = x
′
i ∀ i ∈ N\j.
Then one has that
xˆ(N) = v(N) and xˆ(T ) = v(T )
and hence again, from the first step, there exists an exact coalition P such
that
xˆ(P ) < v(P ).
As x < x′ < xˆ it follows that
x(P ) < v(P ).
Case 2 Assume that δ < ε
Repeat what was done earlier in Case 1 and this time one has that
x′(N) = v(N) and x′(T ) = v(T )
and again the result follows from the first step. q.e.d.
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The proof of this Lemma given by Peter Sudhölter was the following.
Proof:
As C 6= ∅, T $ N . Define
x1 = x+
v(N)− x(N)
|N \ T | χN\T
(where χR is the indicator function on R ⊆ N). Then x ≤ x1, x1(T ) ≤ x(T )
and x1(N) = v(N). As T is non-exact, x1 /∈ C. Let x0 ∈ C(N, v) and define
xλ := λx1 + (1− λ)x0
for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. As the core is convex and closed, there exists 0 < λˆ < 1 such
that
{xλ | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1} ∩ C(N, v) = {xλ | 0 ≤ λ ≤ λˆ}.
Set y = xλˆ. Then there exists P $ N such that y(P ) = v(P ) and x1(P ) <
v(P ), because x1 /∈ C. The coalition P has the desired properties. q.e.d.
The author’s original proof of Lemma (1.31) will now be given. However
before that is done recall again the set M(x). Let x be an imputation and
define
M(x) := {S |S ⊂ N ;S exact with x(S) < v(S) and x(T ) ≥ v(T )∀T ⊂ S}.
With this notation the following Lemma will be proven:
Lemma 1.74. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let every exact coalition in
C be extendable. If x /∈ C then M(x) 6= ∅.
Proof:
The Lemma will be proven via contradiction. So assume that there exists
an x /∈ C such that M(x) = ∅. That is, for all exact S $ N with x(S) <
v(S) there exist T $ S with x(T ) < v(T ) and T is not exact in C. Now
choose an exact S $ N such that there does not exist an exact R $ S with
x(R) < v(R). Then as before there exists a non-exact T with x(T ) < v(T ).
Lemma (1.73) applied this to the imputation x with N in Lemma (1.73)
replaced by S implies that there exists a Q, Q $ S, exact in CS such that
x(Q) < v(Q). However as S is extendable, by assumption, Q must be exact
in C contradicting the assumption that there did not exist an exact R $ S
with x(R) < v(R). q.e.d.
With this Lemma, Theorem (1.32) can now be proven as was proven in the
section on Cooperative Games.
The following is the author’s proof of Lemma (1.44).
Lemma 1.75. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU game and let x be an imputation
x /∈ C. Then for all minimal S ∈ E(x) it follows that S is weak fully exact.
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Proof: Let x be an imputation x /∈ C. By Lemma (1.29) it follows that
E(x) 6= ∅. Choose a S ∈ E(x) such that there does not exist T $ S and
T ∈ E(x). As S is exact there exists β ∈ C with β(S) = v(S). Let Pi $ S be
the coalitions such that β(Pi) = v(Pi), that is the Pi are exact (if any exist
at all). As well, by assumption, x(Pi) ≥ v(Pi) as otherwise there would exist
a Pi $ S such that x(Pi) < v(Pi) contradicting the assumption that S was
the smallest such exact coalition with x(S) < v(S). Now consider the vector
xλ := (1− λ)β + λx
for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then for all 0 < λ ≤ 1 it follows that xλ(S) < v(S). Let
L := 2S \ (
⋃
i
Pi ∪ ∅).
Then for all M $ S with M ∈ L it follows that β(M) > v(M). Now choose
0 < ε 1 such that the vector xε still satisfies xε(M) > v(M) for all M $ S
with M ∈ L. It now follows however that xε(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T $ S and
xε(S) < v(S). Hence define
δ := v(S)− xε(S)
and add
δ
s
, where s = |S|, to each element xεi for i ∈ S. That is, define
x′ = xε +
δ
s
χS.
It then follows that x′(T ) > v(T ) for all T $ S and that x′(S) = v(S) and
as S was exact, S is weak fully exact. q.e.d.
References
[1] Azrieli Y. and Lehrer E.: A note on the concavification of
a cooperative game http://www.math.tau.ac.il/ azrieliy/papers/Note-
concav-cooperative-8.pdf.
[2] Biswas A. K., Parathasarathy T., Potters J. A. M. and
Voorneveid M.: Large cores and exactness Games and Economic
Behavior 28, (1999), pp 1 - 12.
[3] Bondereva O.: The theory of the core in an n-person game (in
Russian) Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. 13, (1962), pp. 141-142
[4] van Gellekom J. R. G., Potters J. A. M. and Reijnierse J.
H.: Prosperity properties of TU games International Journal of Game
Theory 28, (1998), pp 211 - 227.
? REFERENCES ? 32
[5] Gillies D.B.: Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum Games Contri-
butions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics
Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton:Princeton
University Press., (1959), pp. 47 - 85.
[6] Harsanyi J. C.: A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game
Situations Econometrica 34, (1966), pp. 613 - 634.
[7] Kalai E. and Zemel E.: Generalized network problems yielding
totally balanced games Operations Research 30, (1982), 998 - 1008.
[8] Kikuta K. and Shapley L. S.: Unpublished Manuscript, (1986).
[9] Kulakovskaja T.E.: Necessary and Sufficient conditions for the
coincidence of core and solution in a classical cooperative game Soviet
Math. Dokl. (19) Vol. 12, No. 4, (1971), 1231 - 1234.
[10] Peleg B. and Sudhölter P.: Introduction to the theory of coop-
erative games Boston: Kluwer Academic Publ., (2003).
[11] Raghavan T. E. S. and Sudhölter P.: The modiclus and core
stability International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 33, (2005), pp.
467 - 478.
[12] Rosenmüller J.: Game Theory: stochastics, information, strate-
gies and cooperation Boston: Kluwer Academic Publ. , (2000).
[13] Shapley L. S.: On balanced sets and cores Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly 14, (1967), 453-460.
[14] Shapley L. S. and Shubik S.: The assignment game I: The core
International Journal of Game Theory 2, (1972), 111 - 130.
[15] Sharkey W. W.: Cooperative games with large cores International
Journal of Game Theory 11, (1982), pp. 175 - 182.
[16] Solymosi T. and Raghavan T. E. S.: Assignment games with
stable core International Journal of Game Theory 30, (2001), 177 -
185.
[17] van Velzen S., Hamers. H.J.M and Solymosi T.: CORE
STABILITY IN CHAIN-COMPONENT ADDITIVE GAMES Cen-
tER discussion Paper 2004-101, (October 2004).
[18] von Neumann J. and Morgenstern O.: Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, (1944, 1947, 1953).
